The ideal of a “strict science” in philosophy
The article analyzes the reform program philosophy on the principle of “strict science” in the phenomenological teachings of Edmund Husserl. Shows the importance of logic in the process. A comparative analysis of the logical investigations Frege and G.E. Husserla. Shows how influenced by phenomenology on the formation of the meanings of “real” and “objective” in the writings of epistemologies of the twentieth century. The objectivist, or materialist naturalism as a form of connect two separately established areas of knowledge, empirical experience and logical relations, from the point of view of Husserl, shows its failure, because the empirical is focused on the spontaneous form of consciousness, whereas classical formal logic is an abstract from the reality of regulatory design. In this regard, husserl, analytically describing the spontaneous work of consciousness, insisting on the reform of logic and bring it into line with the variety of perception of the world in consciousness. The development of non-classical logics in the twentieth century, a vindication of Husserl.